Alexander hamilton biography federalist 78

In a monarchy it is an excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince; in a republic it is a no less excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body. And it is the best expedient which can be devised in any government, to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws. Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive, that, in a government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them.

The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever.

It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments. There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void.

No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny this, would be to affirm, that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers, may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid.

If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their own powers, and that the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the other departments, it may be answered, that this cannot be the natural presumption, where it is not to be collected from any particular provisions in the Constitution.

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Alexander hamilton biography federalist 78

In other projects. Wikisource Wikidata item. Controls on judicial conduct [ edit ]. Good behavior tenure [ edit ]. Legislative review of judicial decisions [ edit ]. Judicial review [ edit ]. References [ edit ]. Treanorp. Morrisp. External links [ edit ]. Wikisource has original text related to this article: Federalist No. The Federalist Papers.

Category Portal:History The Federalist. Hidden categories: Articles with short description Short description matches Wikidata Use American English from March All Wikipedia articles written in American English Use mdy dates from March All articles with unsourced statements Articles with unsourced statements from June Toggle the table of contents. The executive not only dispenses the honors but holds the alexander hamilton biography federalist 78 of the community.

The legislature not only commands the purse but prescribes the rules by which the alexanders hamilton biography federalist 78 and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever.

It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments. This simple view of the matter suggests several important consequences. It proves incontestably that the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power; that it can never attack with success either of the other two; and that all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks.

It equally proves that though individual oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of justice, the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter: I mean, so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislative and executive. The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution.

By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, [2] and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of the courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void.

Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing. Some perplexity respecting the right of the courts to pronounce legislative acts void, because contrary to the Constitution, has arisen from an imagination that the doctrine would imply a superiority of the judiciary to the legislative power.

It is urged that the authority which can declare the acts of another void must necessarily be superior to the one whose acts may be declared void. As this doctrine is of great importance in all the American constitutions, a brief discussion of the grounds on which it rests cannot be unacceptable. There is no position which depends on clearer principles than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void.

No legislative act therefore contrary to the constitution can be valid. To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid.

If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their own powers and that the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the other departments it may be answered that this cannot be the natural presumption where it is not to be collected from any particular provisions in the Constitution. It is not otherwise to be supposed that the Constitution could intend to enable the representatives of the people to substitute their will to that of their constituents.

It is far more rational to suppose that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is in fact, and must be regarded by the judges as, a fundamental law.

It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. Another factor contributing to the independence of the judiciary is the judges' right to hold office during good behavior. It is in connection with his advocacy of that "excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of that reprehensive body," that "citadel of the public justice," that Hamilton pronounces judicial review as being part of the Constitution.

Judicial review is another barrier against too much democracy. Exercised by state courts before the Federal Convention met, and taken for granted by the majority of the members of the Convention, as well as by the ratifying conventions in the states, judicial review is expounded by Hamilton as a doctrine reaching a climax and a conclusion in this Federalist paper.

Starting out from the premise that "a constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judged, as a fundamental law," Hamilton considers judicial review as a means of preserving that constitution and, thereby, free government. To be more concrete, when Hamilton considers the judiciary both as a barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body and as the citadel of public justice, i.

Parallel to every denial of legislative power in essay seventy-eight goes an assertion of vested rights. Note that the Supreme Court did not ultimately grant itself the explicit power of judicial review until the case Marbury v. Madison in Although he considers a power-concentration in the legislature as despotism, Hamilton does not perceive a strong judiciary as a threat to free government.

He admits that individual oppression may now and then proceed from the courts, but he is emphatic in adding that the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter. When the judge unites integrity with knowledge, power is in good hands. As the "bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments," they will use that power for the protection of the individual's rights rather than for infringements upon those rights.

Through judicial review vested rights are protected not only from the legislature, they are also protected from the executive. The Question and Answer section for The Federalist Papers is a great resource to ask questions, find answers, and discuss the novel.